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Introduction 
Police stops, detentions, and arrests based on racial or ethnic profiling 
have been widely condemned.1  Racial profiling refers to the use of an 
individual’s race or ethnicity by law enforcement personnel as a key factor 
in deciding whether to engage in enforcement action.2  In addition to 
questions about its effectiveness as a tool of law enforcement,3 such 
profiling raises the prospect of discrimination based on race or ethnicity and 
differential treatment of individuals solely based on personal traits or 
characteristics.  There are increasing reports of police profiling based on 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗  This Article derives from a transcript of a presentation given on Friday, March 18, 
2011, at the Traffic and War on Drugs Symposium, held by the Washington and Lee journal 
of Civil Rights and Social Justice. 
 †  Aaron Haas is the Oliver Hill Law Fellow and the Director of the Citizenship and 
Immigration Program at Washington and Lee University School of Law. 
 1. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Deborah Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (2002) (stating that prior to September 10, 2001, a 
consensus had been reached condemning racial profiling). 
 2. See John Knowles, Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle 
Searches:  Theory and Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203, 204 (2001) (explaining that race is 
one of the factors police use when deciding whether to search cars). 
 3. See Heather Mac Donald, Op-Ed., Fighting Crime Where the Criminals Are, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 26, 2010, at A19 (noting the criticism from civil rights groups after the New 
York Police Department released its annual data on stop-and-frisk interactions). 
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Hispanic ethnicity,4 with indications that such profiling will continue to rise 
in the future. 
This concern is based on two inter-related trends:  the 
criminalization of immigration enforcement and the localization of 
immigration enforcement.  Together, these trends mean that local law 
enforcement—who are engaged in the vast majority of interactions 
between individuals and the police—are increasingly focused on 
finding immigration violators and treating them as criminal suspects.  
In the past, local law enforcement traditionally saw itself as focused on 
protecting public safety in the community, while the immigration 
system was a civil matter of solely national concern.5  Today, 
immigration enforcement is mediated through the criminal justice 
system, and local and state police are encouraged to actively 
participate in finding and detaining undocumented aliens. 
In this paper, which is based on a presentation I made at this 
journal’s spring symposium, I argue that ethnic profiling of the 
Hispanic community has the potential to become a significantly greater 
problem in the coming years.  In Part I, I explain the criminalization of 
immigration enforcement.  In Part II, I will discuss the localization of 
immigration enforcement.  I will argue that the combination of these 
trends creates the danger of profiling.  In Part III, I will discuss how 
these trends have manifested themselves in Virginia, focusing 
specifically on an Attorney General advisory opinion that state and 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See, e.g., Ann M. Simmons, Immigration Traffic Laws Criticized in Louisiana, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2007, at A16 (noting that a state law allowing police to arrest people 
they suspect are illegal immigrants has been used primarily to detain Latinos). 
 5. The preeminence of the federal government in immigration enforcement was 
established as early as the Chinese Exclusion Cases, the first major immigration cases to 
reach the Supreme Court.  See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 605–06 
(1889) (noting that the ability to establish relations with other nations is a federal power).  
The majority stated: 
The control of local matters being left to local authorities, and national matters 
being intrusted [sic] to the government of the Union, the problem of free 
institutions existing over a widely extended country, having different climates 
and varied interests, has been happily solved.  For local interests the several 
states of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with 
foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.  To preserve its 
independence, and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment, is 
the highest duty of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other 
considerations are to be subordinated.  It matters not in what form such 
aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in 
its national character, or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us. 
Id. 
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local law enforcement officers have Arizona-style authority to detain 
undocumented immigrants.  Finally, I conclude with ideas for how to 
prevent or mitigate the potential for immigration-based ethnic profiling 
and areas of further study. 
I.  Criminalization of Immigration Enforcement 
Currently, more than 50% of all federal criminal prosecutions are 
immigration-related.6  Between 2001 and 2009, the number of immigration 
prosecutions in federal court more than quadrupled.7  In 2001, there were 
16,310 immigration-related prosecutions.8  In 2007, there were 39,458 such 
prosecutions,9 and in 2008, there were 79,431 criminal immigration 
enforcement actions in federal courts.10  By 2009, that number jumped to 
91,899, an increase of 463% in eight years and an increase of 133% just 
since 2007.11  For example, in April 2010, there were 9,941 federal 
immigration prosecutions.12  Customs and Border Protection—the agency 
within the Department of Homeland Security that includes the Border 
Patrol—initiated 7,822 new prosecutions in that month alone.13  
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, charged with handling 
                                                                                                                 
 6. FY 2009 Federal Prosecutions Sharply Higher:  Surge Driven by Steep Jump in 
Immigration Filings, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Dec. 21, 2009), 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/223/ (last visited November 3, 2011) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Graphical Highlights:  Federal Criminal Prosecutions Filed by Selected Program 
Areas, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (2007), http://trac.syr.edu/trac 
reports/crim/184/include/table_1.html (last visited November 3, 2011) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 9.  Backgrounder Southwest Border Security Operations, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS 
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Dec. 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/tracatwork/detail/A375.html (last 
visited November 3, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
 10.  Criminal Immigration Prosecutions Are Down, But Trends Differ by Offense, 
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Mar. 17, 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/ 
immigration/reports/227/ (last visited November 3, 2011) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 11. FY 2009, supra note 6. 
 12. Immigration Enforcement under Obama Returns to Highs of Bush Era, 
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Jul. 15, 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/ 
immigration/reports/233/ (last visited November 3, 2011) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 13.  Id. 
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deportations, initiated another 2,119 federal prosecutions in that single 
month.14 
This program is straining our federal criminal justice system through a 
number of unintended consequences.  For one, other criminal behavior is 
being neglected because these prosecutions are using up so much of the 
time of prosecutors, investigators, and judges.  Thus, between 2003 and 
2008, white-collar prosecutions fell by 18%, weapons prosecutions shrank 
by 19%, organized crime prosecutions fell by 20%, public corruption 
prosecutions dropped by 14%, and drug prosecutions declined by 20%.15  
From 2003 to 2009, while immigration prosecutions increased 450%, to 
91,899—the number of prosecutions for business fraud dropped from 322 
to 82.16  As we now know, egregious abuses by the financial industry 
during this period led to a severe economic crisis, and massive frauds like 
that of Bernie Madoff went undetected and unprosecuted until it was too 
late. 
This crowding-out of other prosecutions in pursuit of immigration 
violators includes violent criminal activity.  The New York Times reported 
last year: 
The emphasis [on immigration crimes], many federal judges and 
prosecutors say, has siphoned resources from other crimes, eroded 
morale among federal lawyers and overloaded the federal court system.  
Many of those other crimes, including gun trafficking, organized crime 
and the increasingly violent drug trade, are now routinely referred to 
state and county officials, who say they often lack the finances or 
authority to prosecute them effectively.17 
United States attorneys on the Southwest border usually decline to 
prosecute drug suspects with 500 pounds of marijuana or less—about 
$500,000 to $800,000 worth.18  A federal judge in Austin, Judge Sam 
Sparks, recently expressed his frustration at the increasing toll of these 
prosecutions on his docket, writing “[t]he expenses of prosecuting illegal 
entry and reentry cases (rather than deportation) on aliens without any 
significant criminal history is simply mind-boggling.”19 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Id. 
 15. Solomon Moore, Push on Immigration Crimes Is Said to Shift Focus, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 12, 2009, at A1. 
 16. FY 2009, supra note 6. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Steven Kreytak, Federal Judge Questions Immigration Prosecutions, AUSTIN 
AMERICAN-STATESMAN (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.statesman.com/news/local/federal-judge-
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The federal criminal justice system today is mostly about immigration 
enforcement.  In April 2009, for example, criminal immigration cases made 
up the majority of new federal criminal prosecutions nationwide—about 
9,037 out of 17,180—and outnumbered all white-collar, civil rights, 
environmental, drug-related and other criminal cases combined.20  The 
Department of Homeland Security accounted for 59% of all crimes referred 
to federal prosecutors during that month.21  The reorientation of the federal 
criminal justice system towards immigration enforcement can be seen in the 
geographic disparity of the caseloads.  Presently, just five of the country’s 
ninety-four judicial districts handled 75% of all criminal cases in federal 
district courts nationwide.22  These five districts are the five main districts 
along the United States-Mexico border—Southern California, Arizona, 
New Mexico, West Texas, and South Texas.23  The concentration of federal 
prosecutions along the southwest border can only be attributed to the 
dramatic increase in immigration-related criminal enforcement. 
These immigration prosecutions essentially consist of being found 
having crossed into the United States without permission.  More than 90% 
of the immigration-related federal prosecutions are for illegal entry or 
illegal reentry.24  While it is not a violation of criminal law to be present in 
the United States without permission, it is illegal to cross into the United 
States without permission.25  Therefore, someone who has stayed in the 
United States past an authorized period of stay by, for example, overstaying 
                                                                                                                 
questions-immigration-prosecutions-216667.html?printArticle=y (last visited November 3, 
2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 20. Immigration Prosecutions for April 2009, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS 
CLEARINGHOUSE (Apr. 2009), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/ 
monthlyapr09/fil/ (last visited November 3, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Russell Goldman, What’s Clogging the Courts?  Ask America’s Busiest Judge, 
ABC NEWS (July 23, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=5429227&page=1 
(last visited November 3, 2011) (explaining how the courts along the United States-Mexico 
border handle a disproportionate amount of the country’s crime) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee University Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Illegal Entry Becomes Top Criminal Charge, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS 
CLEARINGHOUSE (June 10, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/251/ (last visited 
November 3, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). 
 25. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2011) (describing what constitutes improper entry by an 
alien); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2011) (stating the criminal penalties for reentry by removed 
or deported aliens). 
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a temporary visa, has not violated any criminal law.  On the other hand, a 
person who has crossed the border into the United States without 
permission has committed a crime, regardless of the length of time that the 
person was improperly in the United States.  This distinction in the law 
means that criminal enforcement is strongly connected to border 
enforcement, in which the violators are almost exclusively of Hispanic 
ethnicity, as opposed to the broader diversity of unauthorized immigrants 
from all over the world who entered the country legally but have overstayed 
a visa. 
Much of the increase is due to Operation Streamline, an “interior 
enforcement” program designed to dramatically increase criminal 
immigration prosecutions, often through large-scale raids followed by mass 
plea bargains.26  Operation Streamline entails arrests made by federal 
agents, primarily in the border region.27  Operation Streamline, and the 
dramatic increase in federal immigration prosecutions associated with it, 
has raised a number of concerns among scholars and advocates.28  The 
resources entailed in this ambitious agenda have crowded out resources for 
other kinds of cases and other criminal activity.29  The burden on the system 
and the cost to taxpayers are also significant.30  The mass detentions and 
prosecutions also raise issues of due process, including access to counsel.31  
                                                                                                                 
 26. See Ted Robbins, Border Patrol Program Raises Due Process Concerns, 
(National Public Radio broadcast Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=129780261 (last visited November 3, 2011) (providing a description of 
Operation Streamline) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, OPERATION 
STREAMLINE FACT SHEET 1 (2009), available at http://www.immigrationforum.org/ 
images/uploads/OperationStreamlineFactsheet.pdf (last visited November 3, 2011) 
(explaining that Operation Streamline takes away resources from other law enforcement 
duties and criminal prosecutions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 29. See Goldman, supra note 22 (stating that critics claim Operation Streamline 
prevents resources from going to the pursuit of more dangerous offenders). 
 30. See Ted Robbins, Morning Edition:  Border Convictions:  High Stakes, Unknown 
Price (National Public Radio broadcast Sept. 14, 2010) http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyId=129829950 (last visited November 3, 2011) (quoting 
Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano as saying it is a “very expensive program”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 31. See JOANNA LYDGATE, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INSTITUTE OF RACE, 
ETHNICITY, AND DIVERSITY, ASSEMBLY-LINE JUSTICE:  A REVIEW OF OPERATION STREAMLINE  
1 (2010), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_ 
Brief.pdf (last visited November 3, 2011) (stating that the Ninth Circuit found conducting en 
masse migrant hearings to be a due process violation) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
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Many of the prosecutions are rushed, rely heavily on plea bargains, and 
often occur with minimal access to adequate legal representation.32  As this 
system expands beyond the border area to the rest of the nation, I believe 
these issues will follow.  Moreover, I believe additional issues will crop up, 
particularly in the manner of detaining and arresting aliens accused of 
violating federal criminal law.  Local law enforcement will be primarily 
tasked with arresting these individuals, and there is significant danger that 
their efforts will be marked by increased profiling.33  It is this localization 
of immigration enforcement, combined with its criminalization, which will 
create the conditions for greater profiling of the Hispanic community by the 
police. 
II.  Localization of Immigration Enforcement 
Local law enforcement has been empowered to enforce immigration 
laws, and their size and reach will make them the primary and front-line 
agents of civil and criminal immigration enforcement.34  This localization 
of immigration enforcement has occurred through a number of federal 
initiatives.35  The Secure Communities program checks the fingerprints of 
individuals arrested or otherwise processed by local law enforcement 
against federal databases operated by the Department of Homeland 
Security.36  Individuals who are positively matched as subject to deportation 
                                                                                                                 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 32. See id. at 4 (stating that many defendants complete the criminal proceeding in one 
day, with attorneys representing up to eighty clients in a single hearing). 
 33. See infra Part II (discussing increased profiling at the local law enforcement level). 
 34. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1996) (detailing circumstances under which local law 
enforcement can arrest illegal aliens); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006) (describing how 
the Attorney General can enter into memoranda of understanding with local law enforcement 
to enforce immigration laws). 
 35. See Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited November 3, 2011) (describing how 
the Secure Communities Program operates) (on file with the Washington and Lee University 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see also Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. Law No. 104-208 (1996) (discussing section 
287(g) enforcement); Criminal and Alien Program, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program/ (last visited November 3, 2011) 
(detailing the tenets of the Criminal and Alien Program, and how Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) utilizes them) (on file with the Washington and Lee University Journal 
of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 36. See Secure Communities, supra note 35 (describing the process by which 
individuals are processed through the government system). 
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are asked to be held by local jails until transferred to a federally-operated 
immigrant detention facility, where they are placed in removal 
proceedings.37  The 287(g) program, named after the section of the United 
States Code from which the authority derives,38 takes the Secure 
Communities program a step further by actually deputizing local law 
enforcement to check immigration status of suspected aliens and detain 
those determined to be subject to removal.39  The Criminal Alien Program 
(CAP) stations federal Homeland Security officials at state and local 
prisons and jails, or allows them to remotely monitor the facilities, to check 
the immigration status of individuals processed through the facilities.40  A 
large portion of aliens placed in deportation proceedings are located by 
local law enforcement agents and transferred to federal immigration 
custody through one of these programs.  This use of local police, sheriffs, 
and other non-federal agents is the essential platform upon which the 
federal government’s immigration enforcement strategy is based. 
The idea of these programs is to find undocumented or criminal aliens 
who are being detained anyway for violations of the law in the areas where 
they reside.41  The federal government can then take hold of the aliens after 
the local criminal process has completed.42  However, even in the initial 
phases of this effort, these programs appear to change the behavior of some 
local law enforcement agencies in such a way that they target for arrest 
individuals suspected of violating immigration law.43  That is, they are not 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See id. (discussing local law enforcement procedures regarding potential 
deportation). 
 38. See Pub. Law No. 104-208 (detailing the provisions of section 287(g)). 
 39. See Fact Sheet:  Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration 
and Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice. 
gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited November 3, 2011) (explaining how ICE 
uses Section 287(g)) (on file with the Washington and Lee University Journal of Civil Rights 
and Social Justice). 
 40. See Criminal and Alien Program, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program/ (last visited November 3, 2011) (detailing how 
the Criminal and Alien Program processes individuals) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
University Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 41. See sources cited supra note 35 (discussing the objectives of each program). 
 42. See id. and accompanying text. 
 43. See Trevor Gardner II & Aarti Kohli, The C.A.P. Effect:  Racial Profiling in the 
ICE Criminal Alien Program, POLICY BRIEF:  THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INSTITUTE 
OF RACE, ETHNICITY, & DIVERSITY, 1, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY (Sept. 2009) 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_FINAL.pdf (last visited November 3, 
2011) (concluding that local police officers began targeting individuals strictly based on 
racial appearance more often after the Criminal Alien Program changed from in person 
review to remote access) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
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simply handing over undocumented or criminal aliens who happen to have 
come into their grasp; rather, in at least some instances, they are actually 
pursuing such aliens, often under the pretense of criminal investigation, for 
the very purpose of handing them over to the federal government for 
immigration enforcement actions.44 
A study by the Earl Warren Institute at the University of California, 
Berkeley, examined changing police behavior in Irving, Texas, after the 
initiation of CAP in April 2007.45  The study found that in the following 
three months, from April 2007 to July 2007, the number of traffic arrests of 
Hispanic motorists increased 223%, from 48 to 155.46  Such a dramatic 
increase in traffic arrests focused on a specific ethnicity in such a short 
period of time is hard to explain in terms of local law enforcement.47  It 
appears that local officers saw an opportunity to deport undocumented 
aliens, using pretextual stops or heightened scrutiny to justify detention of 
aliens who can then be transferred to federal immigration custody 
regardless of the validity of the alleged underlying criminal activity on 
which the stop was based.48 
This misuse of local criminal arrest authority to advance an 
immigration enforcement agenda appears to have occurred in other parts of 
the country in the border region that has heretofore been the focus of these 
efforts.  Perhaps the most notorious example is the “sweeps” conducted by 
the sheriff’s office in Maricopa County, Arizona, in which a large number 
of agents descend upon a single area.49  While these sweeps were ostensibly 
                                                                                                                 
Social Justice). 
 44. See id. at 5–6 (illustrating the ways in which the local police target certain groups); 
see also Sarah Mehta, Local Enforcement Tactics Lead to Racial Profiling, Human Rights 
Abuses, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION BLOG OF RIGHTS (Mar. 29, 2011, 9:57 AM), 
http://www.aclu.org/blog/human-rights-immigrants-rights/local-enforcement-tactics-lead-
racial-profiling-human-rights-abu (discussing the case of a woman who was questioned by 
law enforcement because of her appearance and accent) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee University Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 45. See Gardner & Kohli, supra note 43, at 1 (giving a brief overview of the Texas 
study). 
 46. Id. at 6. 
 47. See id. at 8 (examining the number of traffic arrests). 
 48. See id. at 8 (giving examples of officers pulling over individuals for discretionary 
reasons). 
 49. See Daniel Gonzalez, Sheriff’s Office Says Race Plays No Role in Who Gets Pulled 
Over, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC (Oct. 5, 2008), http://www.azcentral.com/ news/articles/ 
2008/10/05/20081005arpaio-profiling1005.html (last visited November 3, 2011) (discussing 
in detail allegations against Maricopa County police concerning racial profiling during 
police stops) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). 
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focused on criminal activity, the patterns of detention and arrest indicate 
that immigration enforcement may have been the true motive.50  The 
Arizona Republic reported, 
The records show that most people arrested were Latinos, even when the 
sweeps were held in predominantly White areas.  The sweeps frequently 
targeted heavily Latino areas or day-labor corridors, and most of those 
arrested during highly discretionary stops for reasons such as cracked 
windshields were Latinos, the records show.  Immigration enforcement 
also seemed to be a main goal of the operations, which is prohibited:  In 
five of the eight sweeps, immigration arrests outnumbered other types of 
arrests, the records show.51 
These federal-local immigration enforcement partnerships may be 
encouraging the use of ethnic profiling.52 
The twin trends of criminalizing and localizing immigration 
enforcement have created a situation in which local police are encouraged 
to target Hispanics for detention and arrest.53  This kind of profiling has 
already been seen in the border areas, but, as the underlying trends go 
national, it can be expected that profiling will also be increasingly seen 
throughout the country.54  The situation is also ripe for exploitation by local 
officials who have little understanding of federal immigration law, or have 
a political or personal agenda in regard to illegal immigration.  Recent 
events by the Attorney General and others in Virginia illustrate these 
concerns. 
III.  Virginia and Immigration Enforcement 
In theory, the newly formed federal-local partnership for immigration 
enforcement should not lead to an increase in stops, detentions, or arrests of 
individuals suspected of being present without authorization.  This civil 
                                                                                                                 
 50. See id. (discussing the overrepresentation of Hispanic arrests). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Gardner & Kohli, supra note 43, at 1 (“The Warren Institute’s study of arrest 
data finds strong evidence that Irving police engaged in racial profiling of Hispanics . . . .”). 
 53. See id. at 4 (“[T]he Criminal Alien Program tacitly encourages local police to 
arrest Hispanics for petty offenses.”). 
 54. See Gabriela Garcia, Philadelphia’s Police and ICE Collaborations Might Be the 
Worst of All, CHANGE.ORG (Aug. 10, 2011), http://news.change.org/stories/philadelphias-
police-and-ice-collaborations-might-be-the-worst-of-all (last visited November 3, 2011) 
(lamenting the Secure Communities’ actions in Philadelphia amid fears that racial profiling 
might occur) (on file with the Washington and Lee University Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
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infraction alone cannot be the basis of police stops.55  Local law 
enforcement is only supposed to check the immigration status of individuals 
who have separately been detained for criminal violations, in accordance 
with their normal job duties.56  The immigration checks are added onto an 
otherwise lawful stop, but are not to form the original basis of the stop 
itself.57  However, due to misunderstandings between the civil-criminal 
distinctions, arguably augmented by political or personal agendas, there is 
increasing evidence that the system does not work as planned in practice.58 
In 2010, the Virginia Attorney General was asked whether local police 
have existing authority to conduct Arizona-style stops of people suspected 
of violating the immigration laws.59  His response, in relevant part, was, 
So long as the officers have the requisite level of suspicion to believe 
that a violation of the law has occurred, the officers may detain and 
briefly question a person they suspect has committed a federal crime.  
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has found that so long as 
the questioning does not prolong a lawful detention, police may ask 
questions about immigration status.60 
This finding appears to say that Virginia law enforcement officers 
have the authority to briefly detain an individual they suspect is in violation 
of immigration laws and question him about his immigration status.61  Such 
a finding would be consistent with the Arizona law, which says that “where 
reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully 
present in the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when 
practicable, to determine the immigration status of the person.”62 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See supra text accompanying notes 43–53 (discussing examples of officer 
rationale for police stops). 
 56. See id. (describing the job duties of local law enforcement as determined by 
agency policy on checking immigration status). 
 57. See id. (detailing how immigration checks are supposed to operate under regular 
police stops). 
 58. See Gardner and Kohli, supra note 43, at 1 (listing racial profiling as one potential 
consequence of federal-local immigration partnerships). 
 59 See 2010 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 47, 1 (Jul. 30, 2010) available at 
http://www.oag.state.va.us/Opinions%20and%20Legal%20Resources/Opinions/2010opns/1
0-047-Marshall.pdf [hereinafter Advisory Opinion] (stating that he was analyzing the issues 
presented in response to a request for an official advisory opinion on the matter) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 60. Id. at 3 (citing Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100–01(2005)). 
 61. See id. (discussing the ability of Virginia police to briefly detain individuals). 
 62. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1501(B) (2010). 
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However, a closer look at the operative language indicates that his 
opinion is more circumscribed, consistent with the law, but articulated in 
such a confusing manner that it will likely lead to improper enforcement.  
First, he says that officers may briefly detain and question a person if they 
have a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed.63  This does 
not apply to immigration violations because they are civil offenses, not 
crimes.  He then follows up that statement by saying that a person, once 
lawfully detained, may be asked of his immigration status so long as it does 
not prolong the detention.64 This claim is based on a case in which someone 
was questioned while independently detained pursuant to a valid search 
warrant,65 but it would not apply to someone stopped simply for suspicion 
of violating immigration law (because such a detention would not be 
lawful), nor would it ordinarily apply to questioning beyond what an officer 
needs to ascertain whether a crime has been committed (because it would 
prolong the detention). 
It is true that law enforcement officers have the right to stop people 
suspected of committing a crime, and it is also true that immigration status 
can be examined so long as it does not prolong the stop.66  However, the 
coupling of these propositions and the way in which they are worded lead 
to a strong possibility for misinterpretation.  Without sufficient parsing, the 
opinion appears to allow for stops based on suspected violations of 
immigration law and questioning about the same.  Indeed, the Attorney 
General’s opinion then combines these two separate propositions to reach 
the inaccurate conclusion that Virginia officers have existing authority to do 
what the Arizona law ordered its officers to do—stop and question 
individuals suspected of being in the country unlawfully.  He writes, 
“Virginia law enforcement officers have the authority to make the same 
inquiries as those contemplated by the new Arizona law.”67  This bold 
conclusion rests on the propositions that the Arizona law is constitutional, 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 59, at 3 (“So long as the officers have the 
requisite level of suspicion to believe that a violation of the law has occurred, the officers 
may detain and briefly question a person they suspect has committed a federal crime.”). 
 64.  See id. (“[S]o long as the questioning does not prolong a lawful detention, police 
may ask questions about immigration status.”). 
 65.  See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100–01 (2005) (finding that no independent 
reasonable suspicion is needed for an officer to question an individual about immigrant 
status). 
 66.  See id. (concluding that when a detention is not prolonged, officers “[do] not need 
reasonable suspicion” to inquire about “name, date and place of birth, or immigration 
status”). 
 67. Advisory Opinion, supra note 59, at 3. 
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which has been found not to be the case by the courts,68 and that Virginia 
law enforcement officers have existing authority to do what the Arizona 
legislation attempts to authorize.  However, the Attorney General’s opinion 
is almost certainly incorrect, and will likely lead to improper stops and 
profiling of Hispanic motorists. 
To understand why Virginia officers do not “have the authority to 
make the same inquiries as those contemplated by the new Arizona law,”69 
it is necessary to look at what the Arizona law actually authorizes.  
Section 2 of SB 1070 reads, “[f]or any lawful contact made by a law 
enforcement official . . . where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is 
an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States, a reasonable 
attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the immigration 
status of the person.”70  This provision has a few elements.  First, it requires 
a lawful contact.  Presumably, a lawful contact occurs when an officer has 
reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred—the standard set by the 
Supreme Court71 and mirrored in the Virginia Attorney General’s opinion.72  
Second, once a “reasonable suspicion” that a person is unlawfully present 
has been established, the officer must make a “reasonable attempt” to 
ascertain the person’s immigration status.73 
This provision creates a few scenarios in which profiling could occur.  
First, an officer could stop someone based on reasonable suspicion that he 
has committed a criminal violation of the immigration laws.  However, 
illegal presence is not a criminal violation.  Illegal entry and reentry are 
criminal violations.74  This raises the question of how an officer in a state 
far removed from the border, such as Virginia, could establish a reasonable 
suspicion that an individual has entered the country unlawfully?  It is hard 
to see how such a suspicion could be established without use of a racial or 
                                                                                                                 
 68. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F.Supp.2d 980, 1008 (D. Ariz., 2010) (granting 
a preliminary injunction against those portions of the law related to police stops), aff’d, 641 
F. 3d 339, 344 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 69. Advisory Opinion, supra note 59, at 3. 
 70. S. 1070, 49th Leg., Second Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). 
 71. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that stopping and searching a 
suspected armed criminal is allowed under the Fourth Amendment). 
 72. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 59, at 3 (“So long as the officers have the 
requisite level of suspicion to believe that a violation of the law has occurred, the officers 
may detain and briefly question a person they suspect has committed a federal crime.”). 
 73.  See S. 1070, 49th Leg., Second Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (requiring law enforcement 
officers to make a reasonable attempt to ascertain the immigrant status of persons suspected 
of being an alien). 
 74. See supra note 25 (describing the criminality of illegal entry). 
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ethnic profile.  The second scenario is that an individual is stopped on 
suspicion of a separate criminal offense, but the stop is prolonged because 
the officer has “reasonable suspicion” that the person is in the country 
unlawfully.  Again, it would appear that this suspicion would have to be 
based on profiling.  The final scenario is that an officer who suspects the 
person is undocumented and wants to check his status uses a pretext to stop 
him.  Under any scenario, this provision enables and even invites profiling 
from local law enforcement. 
Local law enforcement’s new role as the primary enforcer of 
immigration law will lead to profiling of not only undocumented 
immigrants, but of Hispanics who reside in the country legally.  They 
face the prospect of more frequent police stops on suspicion of an 
unlawful status, and longer police stops as their documentation is 
checked and verified.  The constant demands to “show one’s papers” 
will itself constitute a form of harassment, and one that is particularly 
objectionable to many Americans, as can be seen by the vigorous 
opposition to any form of national identification card.75  If a person 
does not have documentation on him or is not able to quickly produce 
the requested documentation, he faces detention or prolonged stops 
that could significantly hamper his life.  Moreover, there is no system 
in place at the state and local levels to avoid repeated inquiries of the 
same individual. That is, under this new legal regime, nothing would 
prevent immigration status inquiries any time a person who generates 
suspicion (through, for example, his accent or appearance) encounters 
the police, necessitating a constant and ongoing pressure to 
demonstrate one’s legal presence at any time. 
It should also be noted that immigration status is often not clear, 
particularly to local law enforcement officers who have little to no 
training or experience in the immigration system.  Some people may be 
lawfully present and even known to federal immigration authorities, 
but without documentation.  A person seeking asylum, for example, is 
known to the federal government and is permitted to be in the country 
while his application is adjudicated.  But he would not ordinarily have 
documentation attesting to legal presence, nor would he fall into any 
established category of legal status.  Aliens who have been victims of 
                                                                                                                 
 75.  See generally, NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS:  ESSAYS IN OPPOSITION (Carl 
Watner & Wendy McElroy eds., 2004) (providing information and perspectives on the 
opposition that has occurred in response to both historical and contemporary efforts to issue 
a national identification card). 
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crimes and are applying for U76 or T visas77 or self-petitioning under 
the Violence against Women Act78 would be in the same category.  
People who cannot return to their homeland due to natural disasters, 
such as the recent earthquake in Haiti,79 may be under Temporary 
Protected Status but without any documentation to satisfy non-federal 
agents.80  Foreigners present under the Visa Waiver Program, under 
which nationals of certain friendly countries are not required to obtain 
a visa to visit the United States, may not have any relevant 
documentation.81  Perhaps the most affected group is U.S. citizens, 
who are generally not in the habit of carrying a passport or birth 
certificate with them in the course of their day-to-day lives.  The kind 
of profiling likely to be engendered by these new laws will cause a 
severe burden for many people. 
It can also be expected that the problems identified at the federal 
level in the border states will migrate to the state level as immigration 
enforcement undergoes a similar migration.  As mentioned above, 
aggressive immigration enforcement through the federal criminal 
justice system has been a burden on taxpayers, has crowded out 
resources for other prosecutions, and has undermined due process and 
access to counsel.82  As local police, prosecutors, and jails are asked to 
play a significantly greater role in immigration enforcement, they will 
have less time to spend on their traditional duties enforcing criminal 
laws to promote public safety.  A police officer who detains an 
individual to ascertain immigration status will have less time to patrol 
                                                                                                                 
 76.  See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) 
(granting visas to qualified aliens who had been victim to serious criminal activities). 
 77.  See id. (granting visas to qualified aliens who had been victims of human 
trafficking). 
 78.  See id. § 204(a)(1)(A)–(B), 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)–(B) (allowing certain family 
members to file a petition with the Attorney General asking for immigrant visas). 
 79. See TPS Designated Country:  Haiti, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS, 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgn
extchannel=e54e60f64f336210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextoid=e54e60f64f33
6210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last visited November 3, 2011) (showing Haiti as a 
country designated with temporary protected status) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 80.  See Immigration and Nationality Act § 244, 8 U.S.C. 1254a (2006) (giving the 
Attorney General authority to grant an alien temporary protected status). 
 81.  See id. § 217, 8 U.S.C. 1187 (2006) (listing the ways foreign visitors can be in the 
U.S. without a visa or border identification card). 
 82.  See supra Part I (discussing how the increase in immigration-related prosecution is 
burdening the criminal system). 
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and investigate criminal activity in his area.  Jail space that would 
ordinarily be used for people who commit crimes will be dedicated to 
holding suspected illegal or criminal aliens on detainers issued by the 
Department of Homeland Security.  Local governments will be forced 
to make difficult trade-offs or to pour more resources into law 
enforcement in order to meet the additional burdens created by their 
new roles as front-line enforcers of the immigration laws. 
 The new role of local law enforcement will exacerbate the 
problems at the federal level and extend them beyond the border areas.  
The significantly increased federal criminal dockets are mainly 
confined to five judicial districts in the Southwest because the cases 
are generated by federal enforcement activities in those areas, 
particularly the Border Patrol.83  As local law enforcement take over as 
the primary feeders of immigration violators into the federal criminal 
system, the federal courts in the entire country will start to experience 
the same problems as those in the Southwest.  In Virginia, for 
example, the new authority described by the Attorney General can 
expect to locate more undocumented immigrants, many of whom will 
then be transferred to federal custody and criminally prosecuted for 
illegal entry or illegal reentry.  The Federal District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia, based in Northern Virginia, which is 
known for aggressive pursuit of immigration violators, has already 
experienced some of this increase in immigration prosecutions.84 
 Whereas five years ago, this district ranked 21st in the country in 
immigration prosecutions, it had moved up to 13th by 2009, and 9th in 
2010.85  Bulging federal criminal dockets, almost exclusively due to 
immigration prosecutions, will likely be a national phenomenon if 
present trends continue. 
To date, these trends have been marked by a rapid push to 
significantly alter the nature of immigration enforcement with 
insufficient thought put into whether this movement will lead to 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See Goldman, supra note 22 (explaining that the increase in federal criminal 
dockets is driven by five districts in the Southwest) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 84. See Immigration Prosecutions for November 2010, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS 
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Feb. 16, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/ 
immigration/monthlynov10/fil/ (last visited November 3, 2011) (describing the increase in 
federal criminal immigration enforcement in Eastern District of Virginia) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 85. Id. 
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increased profiling, and, if so, how to combat that tendency.  In 
Part IV, I suggest ways to determine the extent to which ethnic 
profiling has increased as a result of the issues raised in this Article, 
and things police agencies can do to ensure that their new role in 
immigration enforcement does not lead to profiling. 
IV.  Proposals 
Secure Communities and the other federal programs identified above 
have been rapidly adopted by many jurisdictions throughout the country, 
with little thought put into effectiveness, desirability, or collateral 
consequences by the local law enforcement agencies asked to participate.  
The Department of Homeland Security has established a goal of having 
every jurisdiction in the country participating in Secure Communities by 
2013.86  As of March 31, 2011, Secure Communities was activated in 1,315 
jurisdictions in forty-two states, or 41% of all jurisdictions in the country.87  
Virginia has been an enthusiastic proponent of this program, with all 129 
jurisdictions in the Commonwealth participating in Secure Communities as 
of June 15, 2010.88  In fact, Virginia is one of only a handful of states 
outside of the border area that is fully participating in Secure 
Communities.89 
However, many jurisdictions have begun to question whether 
participation in immigration enforcement is an effective use of limited 
resources or if it may have a deleterious effect on other priorities, such as 
fighting crime and establishing strong ties to the community.90  For that 
reason, states and localities have been more willing to refuse to sign up for 
                                                                                                                 
 86. See Activated Jurisdictions, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 1 (Aug. 
2, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf [hereinafter 
I.C.E.] (last visited November 3, 2011) (stating the Department of Homeland Security’s goal 
is to have every jurisdiction in the country participating in Secure Communities by 2013) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 24. 
 89. See id. (indicating that Virginia has full participation in Secure Communities). 
 90. See Jason Buch, Unlike Texas, Some States Ditch ICE Effort Targeting Criminals:  
Other States Leaving Secure Communities, But in Texas, Lawmakers Will Likely Expand the 
ICE Program, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, (June 12, 2011), http://www.chron.com/news/ 
houston-texas/article/Unlike-Texas-some-states-ditch-ICE-effort-1619438.php (stating that 
“several northern states are dropping out of the program that matches the fingerprints of 
those arrested against a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement database”). 
20 18 WASH. & LEE L. J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 003 (2011) 
the program, or even to terminate existing participation.91  On May 4, 2011, 
for example, Illinois announced that it was terminating its involvement in 
the program.92  On May 27, 2011, the California General Assembly 
approved a measure that would allow localities to opt out of participation in 
Secure Communities.93  On June 2, 2011, New York Governor Andrew 
Cuomo announced that his state would suspend its participation in the 
program in order to weigh mounting evidence of its costs on local 
communities and police agencies.94  These states join cities like 
Washington, D.C.,95 San Francisco,96 and Providence, Rhode Island,97 
                                                                                                                 
 91. See id. (providing an explanation for why states are not willing to sign up for the 
program). 
 92. See Sarah Phelan, Illinois Pulls out of Secure Communities, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN 
POLITICS BLOG (May 4, 2011, 8:03 p.m.), http://69-22-180-117.sfbg.com/politics/2011/ 
05/04/illinois-pulls-out-secure-communities (last visited November 3, 2011) (reporting that 
Illinois planned to terminate its involvement with Secure Communities) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 93. See California to Let Counties “Opt Out” of Secure Communities Immigration 
Program, FOX NEWS LATINO (May 27, 2011), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/ 
politics/2011/05/27/california-legislators-pass-let-counties-opt-controversial-secure-
communities/#ixzz1O97ScUgi (last visited November 3, 2011) (reporting that the California 
General Assembly approved a measure that allows local communities to opt out of Secure 
Communities) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). 
 94. See Letter from Mylan Denerstein, Counsel to N.Y. Governor Cuomo, to John 
Sandweg, Counsel to Sec’y of U.S, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 1, 2011), 
http://www.governor.ny.gov/assets/Secure%20Communities.pdf (last visited November 3, 
2011) (announcing that New York planned to suspend participation in Secure Communities) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 95. See Renee Feltz & Stokely Baksh, The Anti-Arizona:  As Other States Get Tough 
on Immigration Enforcement, D.C. Bucks the Trend, THE AM. PROSPECT (May 4, 2010), 
http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_anti_arizona (last visited November 3, 2011) 
(reporting that Washington, D.C. intended to cease participating in Secure Communities) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 96. See Brent Begin, San Francisco to Defy Secure Communities Immigration 
Program, S. F. EXAM’R (May 5, 2011), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/2011/05/san-
francisco-defy-secure-communities (last visited November 3, 2011) (reporting that San 
Francisco would begin releasing low-level illegal immigrant criminals despite federal 
requests to hold them) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
 97. See Gregory Smith, State Police Chief:  Providence Decision on ICE ‘Dangerous’, 
THE PROVIDENCE JOURNAL (Feb. 24, 2011), http://news.providencejournal.com/breaking-
news/2011/02/ri-state-police-chief-criticiz.html#.TsKDl2Cmkg9 (last visited November 15, 
2011) (reporting that Providence Public Safety Commissioner Steven M. Pare asked 
permission of the Department of Homeland Security for the city to stay out of Secure 
Communities) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). 
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which have also expressed an intention to withdraw their participation in 
the program. 
One important step for scholars and activists concerned with the 
implications of these programs on potential profiling of Hispanic residents 
is to gather empirical data on whether such profiling is occurring.  
Anecdotal evidence from other jurisdictions indicates that profiling is 
occurring, as mentioned above.98  However, more comprehensive studies 
are needed.  The facts that Secure Communities is a relatively new 
program, has been activated at different times and in different places, and is 
implemented in some places but not others, create opportunities for useful 
study.  We can look at how Secure Communities has affected arrest rates of 
Hispanics in similarly-situated communities in which the program was 
activated at different times.  For example, Secure Communities started in 
Fairfax, Virginia in March 2009, while it was implemented in Arlington, 
Virginia in April 2010.99  Comparing the arrest and detention rates of 
Hispanics during this one-year period in which the program was active in 
one Northern Virginia community but not the other would provide useful 
context. 
A comparison can also be made between arrests of Hispanics before 
activation and after activation in one locale.  In the City of Lexington, 
Virginia, the home of Washington and Lee University, for example, Secure 
Communities was activated on June 15, 2010.100  We can look at total 
arrests and arrest rates of Hispanics in Lexington in the year before 
activation and the year after activation to see if the program encouraged 
profiling in this city.  Finally, we could compare total arrests, arrest rates, 
and growth of arrests between states that have strongly implemented Secure 
Communities and those that have not.  While Virginia has activated Secure 
Communities in all 129 jurisdictions, the neighboring state of Kentucky has 
activated the program in only 1 of 120 jurisdictions.101  It would be fruitful 
to see whether, for example, there is a higher rate of Hispanic arrests 
relative to their portion of the population in Virginia in comparison to 
Kentucky. 
There is room for other kinds of research to determine the prevalence 
and effect of immigration-related profiling.  One big concern is that 
                                                                                                                 
 98. See supra text accompanying notes 34–54 (discussing how the localization of 
immigration enforcement leads to targeting Hispanic individuals suspected of being illegal 
immigrants). 
 99. I.C.E., supra note 86, at 24. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 9. 
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profiling stemming from the localization and criminalization of 
immigration enforcement will damage relations between local law 
enforcement and immigrant communities. It would be instructive to 
determine if there has been a decrease in such cooperation, as evidenced in, 
for example, a decrease in the reporting of crimes to local police by non-
citizens.  There has been a big push in the last ten to fifteen years to 
encourage immigrants to feel safe about reporting crimes, especially 
domestic violence, to local authorities.102  We need to study whether 
domestic violence reports, arrests, and prosecutions have declined for 
immigrant victims in Secure Communities jurisdictions since the time of 
the activation of the program.  This kind of information can be obtained 
through statistical studies, such as the number of arrests, the number of 
prosecutions, or the number of 911 calls.  Alternatively, surveys can be 
taken in immigrant communities and among law enforcement gauging 
degrees of trust, cooperation, and willingness to report crimes and support 
prosecutions of offenders among immigrants in the communities. 
There are certain steps that law enforcement agencies can take now to 
address the potential of profiling due to these changes.  Local governments 
should pass laws making clear that officers cannot arrest or detain anyone 
solely to investigate immigration status.  This is already the law, but the 
confusing nature of many of these changes combined with misinformation 
call for a clarification of police authority.103  Police agencies should also 
make clear to immigrant communities through public education that victims 
and witnesses from crimes will be protected from immigration enforcement 
if they call on the police and cooperate with the police.  Local police 
agencies need to insist on dialogue with the federal government over 
priorities instead of being a passive recipient of federal mandates.  They 
also must maintain a dialogue with immigrant communities, who may not 
understand the role of the police and who may have misconceptions about 
police due to experiences in their home countries.  Local law enforcement 
                                                                                                                 
 102. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (adding a number of protections for immigrant victims of 
domestic violence to encourage them to go to the police without fear of deportation).  The 
act establishes the U visa for victims of criminal activity including domestic violence who 
have suffered substantial physical or mental abuse and who have assisted or may assist in the 
investigation or prosecution of the crime; allows victims of domestic violence to naturalize 
even if the spouse did not live with the citizen abuser for the requisite period of time; and 
makes other changes to laws to accommodate victims of domestic violence.  Id. 
 103. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1968) (stating that law enforcement may 
briefly stop and investigate an individual only when there is reasonable suspicion that the 
person is involved in criminal activity). 
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must also be vigilant in monitoring and investigating accusations of 
profiling.  Finally, local law enforcement agencies should promulgate clear 
written policies and procedures for government interactions with 
immigrants, so as to avoid any misunderstanding between the police and 
immigrants. 
Immigration enforcement traditionally occurred through civil 
mechanisms at the federal level.104  Increasingly, however, immigration 
enforcement is conducted through the criminal justice system and through 
state and local law enforcement agencies.105  This criminalization and 
localization of immigration enforcement is exemplified in Virginia by the 
Attorney General’s opinion from 2010, which seems to call on local police 
to stop and detain people suspected of violating the immigration laws.106  
These trends create the potential for unlawful profiling, as illegal 
immigration is often associated with the Hispanic ethnicity.  Such profiling 
can be avoided through changes in the law and police practice, but further 
study needs to be done on this emerging issue.  With the right approach, we 
can enforce the immigration laws, keep police focused on fighting crime, 
and protect the civil rights and liberties of all people. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 104.  See supra Part I (describing the criminalization of immigration enforcement). 
 105.  See supra Part I (describing the criminalization of immigration enforcement). 
 106.  See supra text accompanying notes 59–73 (discussing the advisory opinion of the 
Virginia Attorney General). 
